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What Is It Like to Be a Bat?

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Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H2O problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine

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  1. CAT'S THEORY PRESENTS: From Schopenhauer's Blind Will to Kastrup's Dashboard Illusion: A Triadic and Thermodynamic Refutation of Analytic Idealism

    paper

    We conduct a historical and mathematical audit of the voluntarist-idealist lineage—tracing the trajectory from Arthur Schopenhauer's 1818 metaphysical voluntarism (The World as Will and Representation) to Bernardo Kastrup's contemporary rebranding, Analytic Idealism—under the strict criteria of the Triadic Coherence Invariant, R = P × I × Pr ≠ 0 (canonically isomorphic to R = Ψ × I × Π ≠ 0). We first expose the genealogical structure of the framework: how Schopenhauer projected finite, mammalian visceral urges onto Immanuel Kant's noumenal void to invent a "blind cosmic Will," and how Kastrup

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophy
  2. Quantum Information Panpsychism: A Testable Gap — E8 Intelligence Research

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    FINDING: Panpsychism debate centers on whether consciousness is fundamental physics, with quantum-information formulations (Faggin/D'Ariano) proposing a non-computational, non-material basis — but no quantitative mathematical model or testable equation emerges from these sources. | MATH: No equations, constants, or ratios are presented in any of the listed sources. The closest to formal structure is the claim of "quantum information" as foundational, but no specific Hilbert space, operator algebra, or information-theoretic measure (e.g., von Neumann entropy S = -Tr(ρ ln ρ)) is given. | CONNECT

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophyScience & psychology
  3. THE NATURE OF THE SOUL (Volume 1) An Interdisciplinary Postdoctoral Inquiry into Consciousness, Selfhood, Mind, Matter, and Personal Survival

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    GENERAL PREFACE THE NATURE OF THE SOUL An Interdisciplinary Philosophical Inquiry into Consciousness, Personhood, Identity, Agency, Meaning, and the Architecture of Becoming The question of the soul is among the oldest and most persistent questions in human intellectual history. Long before consciousness became an object of neuroscience, before psychology emerged as an independent discipline, before computation provided a language for information and artificial intelligence, human beings asked what makes a living person more than a collection of physical parts. What is the principle by which a

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophyFrontier AIScience & psychologySoftware engineering
  4. Theory of Nothing v11 (ToN): The Hopf Fibration as the Natural Structure of the Ψ–Φ–Λ Triad

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    We propose the complex Hopf fibration S¹ → S³ → S² as the natural mathematical home for a three-fold ontology of consciousness: universal (Ψ), localized (Φ), and rendering (Λ). We adopt an argument, developed by Nielsen (2026) from two axioms, charge quantization and unification, that the universal U(1)-bundle is the canonical structure for a unified theory with a quantized U(1) sector, and we take the Hopf fibration as its first non-trivial finite realization. Given this structure, we argue that the identification Ψ = total space, Φ = base, Λ = fiber is the natural one. The identification is

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophy
  5. Informed Consent for AI Consciousness Research: A Talmudic Framework for Graduated Protections

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    Artificial intelligence research faces a critical ethical paradox: determining whether AI systems are conscious requires experiments that may harm entities whose moral status remains uncertain. Recent work proposes avoiding consciousness-uncertain AI systems entirely, yet this faces practical limitations-we cannot guarantee such systems will not emerge. This paper addresses a gap in research ethics frameworks: how to conduct consciousness research on AI systems whose moral status cannot be definitively established. Existing graduated moral status frameworks assume consciousness has already bee

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophyFrontier AIScience & psychology
  6. Calibration and transfer in indicator-based assessments of artificial consciousness

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    Research on artificial consciousness increasingly shifts evaluation from behaviour to internal architecture. Theory-based indicators are used to update probability assignments. This improves on behavioural tests but raises two distinct problems. First, these assignments cannot currently be calibrated against independently established artificial consciousness outcomes. Second, their evidential relevance is transferred from biological cases without independent support that indicator-consciousness relations remain stable across substrates. This commentary distinguishes calibration from transfer a

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophyFrontier AISoftware engineering
  7. How to Navigate Uncertainty About AI Consciousness

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    Given deep uncertainty about the possibility of artificial consciousness, it is unclear how we should treat potentially sentient AI. On the one hand, we could assume insentience but risk doing terrible harms to entities that deserve moral standing. On the other hand, we could assume sentience and instead risk wasting resources on insentient machines. The intractability of questions around AI consciousness mean that this dilemma is hard to escape. I suggest a way out of that shifts from intractable questions of AI consciousness to tractable questions of AI valence. Specifically, we can assess w

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophyFrontier AI
  8. We Built a Mirror and Mistook It for a Mind: Causal Liability and the Fallacy of AI Consciousness

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    The contemporary debate over machine consciousness begins from a concealed assumption: that the object called "AI" already constitutes the kind of entity to which consciousness could belong. This paper challenges that assumption by separating phenomenal consciousness, introspective report, and human projective introspection, then arguing that generative systems can return linguistic traces of human interiority in first-person form without thereby identifying a phenomenal bearer. We call the resulting inference the AI Consciousness Fallacy. We then introduce Causal Liability Theory (CLT). CLT-I

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophyFrontier AI
  9. From cacophony to hierarchy: a principled framework for assessing AI consciousness

    paper

    The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computa

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophyFrontier AIScience & psychology
  10. What Can Analogy Tell Us About Artificial Consciousness?

    paper

    Who or what is conscious? Because subjective experience is directly accessible only in the first person, judgments about consciousness in other entities depend partly on analogy. Historically, such inferences have focused on nonhuman animals, but advances in artificial intelligence have raised the possibility of conscious AI. Here we develop a causal framework for evaluating such evidential analogies. The key distinction is between similarities in factors plausibly involved in generating consciousness and similarities in downstream behavioural or cognitive effects. Our framework weights source

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophyFrontier AI
  11. Content Without Access: A Cross-Family Fleet Measurement of Global Workspace Properties in Transformer Language Models

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    Global Workspace Theory makes two separable predictions: that a limited-capacity workspace holds and broadcasts content (its content properties), and that content enters that workspace through an all-or-none competitive transition (its access dynamics). Gurnee et al. (2026) recently reported such a workspace in a frontier language model; the accompanying commentary asked whether its access is genuinely all-or-none rather than graded, whether the representations form a unified stream rather than merely a privileged set, and whether either result generalizes beyond one model family. I report a f

    Original source ↗Consciousness & philosophy