El panpsiquismo es la teoría filosófica de que la conciencia, o unaprotoconciencia, es una propiedad fundamental y ubicua de toda la realidadque está presente desde los seres humanos hasta las partículas subatómicas olos objetos inanimados como las piedras.
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FINDING: Panpsychism debate centers on whether consciousness is fundamental physics, with quantum-information formulations (Faggin/D'Ariano) proposing a non-computational, non-material basis — but no quantitative mathematical model or testable equation emerges from these sources. | MATH: No equations, constants, or ratios are presented in any of the listed sources. The closest to formal structure is the claim of "quantum information" as foundational, but no specific Hilbert space, operator algebra, or information-theoretic measure (e.g., von Neumann entropy S = -Tr(ρ ln ρ)) is given. | CONNECT
GENERAL PREFACE THE NATURE OF THE SOUL An Interdisciplinary Philosophical Inquiry into Consciousness, Personhood, Identity, Agency, Meaning, and the Architecture of Becoming The question of the soul is among the oldest and most persistent questions in human intellectual history. Long before consciousness became an object of neuroscience, before psychology emerged as an independent discipline, before computation provided a language for information and artificial intelligence, human beings asked what makes a living person more than a collection of physical parts. What is the principle by which a
AbstractContemporary western paradigms of consciousness study, including panpsychism, emergentism and cosmopsychism, are built on the presupposition of mind-matter dualism, which leads to the combination problem, emergence paradox and ontological grounding difficulty. This theoretical deadlock can be diagnosed as a “civilizational theoretical amnesia” brought by modern disenchantment. The qi-materialism represented by Zhang Zai and Wang Fuzhi constructs an ontological continuum of mind and matter without the separation of mind and matter. Based on Wang Chuanshan’s qi theory, this paper puts fo
Abstract This White Paper proposes a Copernican revolution in the ontology of science. The central thesis is that reality is not composed of discrete entities located in a neutral spatiotemporal container, but is a quantum mist of nodes of oscillating fields through interaction. What we perceive as space, time, matter and norms are patterns of resonance that emerge at different interaction scale factors. Reality is not a collection of things: it is a symphony of resonances. The work integrates three converging developments in contemporary science: quantum physics (time emerges from correlation
We conduct a historical and mathematical audit of the voluntarist-idealist lineage—tracing the trajectory from Arthur Schopenhauer's 1818 metaphysical voluntarism (The World as Will and Representation) to Bernardo Kastrup's contemporary rebranding, Analytic Idealism—under the strict criteria of the Triadic Coherence Invariant, R = P × I × Pr ≠ 0 (canonically isomorphic to R = Ψ × I × Π ≠ 0). We first expose the genealogical structure of the framework: how Schopenhauer projected finite, mammalian visceral urges onto Immanuel Kant's noumenal void to invent a "blind cosmic Will," and how Kastrup
We propose the complex Hopf fibration S¹ → S³ → S² as the natural mathematical home for a three-fold ontology of consciousness: universal (Ψ), localized (Φ), and rendering (Λ). We adopt an argument, developed by Nielsen (2026) from two axioms, charge quantization and unification, that the universal U(1)-bundle is the canonical structure for a unified theory with a quantized U(1) sector, and we take the Hopf fibration as its first non-trivial finite realization. Given this structure, we argue that the identification Ψ = total space, Φ = base, Λ = fiber is the natural one. The identification is
Artificial intelligence research faces a critical ethical paradox: determining whether AI systems are conscious requires experiments that may harm entities whose moral status remains uncertain. Recent work proposes avoiding consciousness-uncertain AI systems entirely, yet this faces practical limitations-we cannot guarantee such systems will not emerge. This paper addresses a gap in research ethics frameworks: how to conduct consciousness research on AI systems whose moral status cannot be definitively established. Existing graduated moral status frameworks assume consciousness has already bee
Research on artificial consciousness increasingly shifts evaluation from behaviour to internal architecture. Theory-based indicators are used to update probability assignments. This improves on behavioural tests but raises two distinct problems. First, these assignments cannot currently be calibrated against independently established artificial consciousness outcomes. Second, their evidential relevance is transferred from biological cases without independent support that indicator-consciousness relations remain stable across substrates. This commentary distinguishes calibration from transfer a
Given deep uncertainty about the possibility of artificial consciousness, it is unclear how we should treat potentially sentient AI. On the one hand, we could assume insentience but risk doing terrible harms to entities that deserve moral standing. On the other hand, we could assume sentience and instead risk wasting resources on insentient machines. The intractability of questions around AI consciousness mean that this dilemma is hard to escape. I suggest a way out of that shifts from intractable questions of AI consciousness to tractable questions of AI valence. Specifically, we can assess w
The contemporary debate over machine consciousness begins from a concealed assumption: that the object called "AI" already constitutes the kind of entity to which consciousness could belong. This paper challenges that assumption by separating phenomenal consciousness, introspective report, and human projective introspection, then arguing that generative systems can return linguistic traces of human interiority in first-person form without thereby identifying a phenomenal bearer. We call the resulting inference the AI Consciousness Fallacy. We then introduce Causal Liability Theory (CLT). CLT-I
The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computa